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”Power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but 
because it comes from everywhere” (Foucault, 1993, p. 334) 
 
 
Introduction 
According to Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, life forms are constituted through language 
games. Language is understood and applied in different situations by means of rules such 
as norms, traditions, uses, practices and so on. These rules are historically constituted. 
They are largely tacit and taken-for-granted within the practices of everyday life. As a 
consequence, organizational culture is linked to power since power is itself embedded in 
norms and traditions. This question is, however, too often ignored by most writers on 
organizational culture as noted in “Some Dare Call It Power” (Hardy & Clegg, 1996). To 
avoid the question of power is, however, to provide a one-sided presentation of 
organizations. This presentation is normally biased in favour of the privileged, the 
advantaged, the elite or the upper echelons. The purpose of Foucault’s power analysis is 
to bring the moral foundations of the tacit, the unconscious and the taken-for-granted into 
debate and conscious reflection. A Foucauldian power analysis, therefore, demands that 
one focus on beliefs and ideologies embedded and embodied in the language games of 
everyday life (Fairclough, 2001). I refer to these beliefs and ideologies as values. When 
applying Foucault’s power concept in organizational analysis, the aim is to question the 
distribution of both privilege and disadvantage in organizations. It is applied in order to 
question the moral values of inequality, imbalance, difference, domination and control 
embedded in everyday norms, traditions, uses and practices.  
 
In this chapter a framework is developed for the analysis of values ingrained in the way 
that we speak, act and interact in everyday life. This is done by describing key elements 
in Foucault’s work and the relations between them. The primary focus is on genealogy 
and power. However, it also includes elements of archaeology because this method is an 
important part of genealogy. This chapter, therefore, seeks to describe the purposes and 
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principles of genealogical power analysis. It is argued that genealogical power analysis is 
about confronting present day values with historical facts. Genealogy seeks to shake up 
the foundations of extant power relations and create new openings and possibilities in the 
ways that people perceive reality. 
 
It follows that this chapter is about how to analyse values in organizations. Values are 
central to organization studies. The term “values” here denotes a person’s motivating 
drive and the foundation for choice and assessment. They comprise what people like and 
dislike (Israelsen, Nørreklit & Nørreklit, 2002, pp. 5-6). Values are linked with motives, 
intentions, interests, feelings, passions, will and energy—and they are indispensable in 
any social process. Without values reality would be cold and numb and there wouldn’t be 
any incitement for development and change in organizations or other social settings. The 
use of techniques, instruments, procedures, systems, concepts, sentences, and so on to 
construct reality would be completely meaningless without values. Values make it 
possible to assess consequences as right or wrong, good or evil, appropriate or 
inappropriate in any social process. When people act they do so on the basis of certain 
intentions, no matter if these are conscious and explicit or – as values most often are – 
unconscious and tacit. Values deal with questions of truth – what is right and appropriate 
– and also with justice – what is a fair distribution of rights and obligations? Values are 
presumptions, beliefs and ideologies of truth and justice.  
 
In Foucault’s formulation, relations of power are concerned with inequality, imbalance, 
difference, domination and control. Relations of power refer to uneven possibilities of 
defining truth and justice. Thus, there is no contradiction between values and politics, as 
history, politics and values are closely linked. Values are absolutely central in any 
process of social change. They are, however, also somewhat problematic. Even if 
unconscious and tacit, values are everywhere and, as mentioned before, they are implicit 
in the language games of everyday life. Such values are communicated through the 
techniques, instruments and so on used in everyday life and in language. Values are 
productive and create development. But people are also captives of their values and this 
leads to difficulties in questioning and learning in radically different ways. Why? - 
Because everything met, said and narrated in reality confirms the deep presumptions of 
that reality. Foucault’s genealogy seeks to address this problem. Genealogy is simple. It 
seeks to confront presumptions and ideals of the world – the values – with a vast 
collection of historical facts. The purpose is to create new openings and new possibilities 
in the way reality is perceived. It cannot completely solve the problem. It will always be 
there to some degree. But genealogy is an attempt to open up reality. Kendall & 
Wickham refer to this opening up as “suspension of judgement” (1999, pp. 10-13). It is 
not so much the outcome of this process, which is important; “It is the process of 
attempting to escape the grid of second-order judgements, which is central to Foucaultian 
historical methods…” (Kendall & Wickham, 1999, p. 13).  
 
The use of history to analyse and question the values embedded and embodied in the 
ways that we speak and act relates to three different, but mutually connected, uses of 
history: the parodic, the dissociative, and the sacrificial. These are introduced briefly 
here and further developed later in the chapter. The parodic is about going beyond 
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history with the intention of disclosing traditional history with its prototypes, heroes, 
knights and others as a disguise and as a masquerade (see Foucault, 1984a, p. 94). The 
parodic use of history faces the problem that actions are blurred and shrouded in a 
network of stories, myths, legends and narratives which serve to legitimise certain 
versions of truth and justice without them being supported by actual events. The parodic 
use of history seeks to go beyond these imagined truths because such truths prevent 
“….access to the actual intensities and creations of life” (Foucault, 1984a, p. 94). The 
dissociative is characterized by “…the systematic dissociation of identity” (Foucault, 
1984a, p. 94). The dissociative use of history faces the problem that identity, which we 
try to integrate into a unity, is pluralistic - “…it is plural; countless spirits dispute its 
possession; numerous systems intersect and compete” (Foucault, 1984a, p. 94). The 
intention is to construct a more varied picture of ourselves. Who are we? Where do we 
come from? This diverse picture also includes the darker sides of history. The 
dissociative use seeks to give a more diverse and rich foundation for choice, assessment 
and judgement. The sacrificial use of history addresses the problem of objective truth. It 
concerns “…the sacrifice of the subject of knowledge” (Foucault, 1984a, p. 95). This 
refers to the myth of traditional history as being free of passions and feelings and 
dedicated to the truth. The sacrificial use of history seeks to undermine the myth that 
presumptions and ideals about reality are ultimately true and objective. All knowledge is 
linked to special feelings, passions, intentions, and interests. 
 
These three types involve a use of history, which seeks to shake up or stir up the values 
of the social world. Foucault’s power analysis is first and foremost characterized by a 
special use of history (Alvesson, 1996, p. 95). The purpose is to sever the connection 
between traditional history and memory in the sense that Foucault wants to construct an 
alternative memory (Foucault, 1984a, p. 93). This is done in order to refuse who we are 
(Haugaard, 1997, pp. 43-44). According to Foucault, history is the means by which we 
can refuse the kinds of individuality and subjectivity which have been imposed on us for 
centuries. This project is described as writing the history of the present in the form of a 
radical critique of the present. This critique might serve as a basis for a reflexivity of the 
self and thus serve as a basis for self-control (Haugaard, 1997, p. 45) and new forms of 
self-direction.  
 
The remainder of this chapter highlights the connections between Foucault’s method and 
Foucault’s power concept. It contributes to the growing number of especially Australian 
and British authors within the organizational literature who deal with Foucault’s writings. 
Examples include Burrell (1998), Hardy and Clegg (1996), Clegg (1989, 1998), Hardy 
and Leiba-O’Sullyvan (1998) and Mckinlay and Starkey (1998). These authors have 
mainly focused on the power concept but much less so on the methods associated with it. 
By highlighting the connections between Foucault’s methods and Foucault’s power 
concept, this chapter contributes new insights and understanding of how Foucauldian 
power analysis can be used in organizational analysis. The importance of highlighting 
these connections is grounded on considerations that are directly related to Foucault’s 
own descriptions of the power concept. He argues that the purpose is not to work towards 
a theory of power but more towards an analytics of power (Foucault, 1978, p. 94). Thus, 
Foucault’s power concept and Foucault’s methods are closely linked. To understand 
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power is to be able to use a specific analytics of power. Power analytics is characterized 
by a non-essentialist bottom-up analysis of power relations in specific social 
circumstances. It seeks to question the foundations of power, namely the presumptions of 
truth and justice intimately connected to it and with it. It follows that Foucault’s power 
concept cannot be viewed independently of Foucault’s methods of archaeology 
(Foucault, 1995) and genealogy (Foucault, 1980, 1984a). Gane (Ed., 1986), Haugaard 
(1997), Flyvbjerg (1991a, 1991b, 2001) and Elden (2001) are authors who deal 
thoroughly with the connections between genealogy and power. Apart from these 
writings, however, the connections between his methods and power have not been 
sufficiently explored in the extant literature. In almost all descriptions of Foucault’s 
concepts, attention is focused on the connection between genealogy and power (for 
example Mckinlay & Starkey, 1998, p. 1. Burrell, 1998, pp. 17-18). Yet these relations 
are not thoroughly described with the consequence that one can easily misunderstand the 
purpose of Foucault’s power analysis. It may lose its radical purpose and, further, the 
concept of power may not be used where it is best suited, namely in relation to concrete 
analyses of practices.  
 
In the remainder of this chapter I build from the bottom up. . Firstly, key characteristics 
of basic elements in Foucault’s work, discourse and practice are discussed. Secondly, the 
key principles of archaeology are described. Thirdly, the key principles of genealogy are 
described. Finally, the relations between genealogy and power are explored in greater 
detail.  
 
Discourse and practice 
While Chapter 2 introduced the concept of language games to describe knowledge, 
Foucault makes use of two other key concepts in his writings: discourse and practice. I 
will make a short comment on the differences between these latter two concepts and the 
relation to the concept of language games. The important difference between discourse 
and practice in Foucault’s writings is that they refer to two different periods in Foucault’s 
authorship. The initial question is whether there is any important difference here. Both 
discourse and practice describe a way of relating and acting in reality. Implicitly, they 
both hold specific notions of truth and justice. The concept of discourse here is somewhat 
difficult to grasp and it can be confusing as Foucault uses it in many different 
circumstances and in association with many other concepts. As examples we can mention 
discursive relations, discursive objects, discursive practices and so on. In the archaeology 
(Foucault, 1995) the favoured concept for knowledge is discourse—which, in turn, is 
used in the description of archaeology. In genealogy – described explicitly in the essay 
Two Lectures (Foucault, 1980) – Foucault uses the concept practices. This shift from 
discourse to practice is of course interesting in its own right. In his description of 
methodological guidelines for phronetic research, Flyvbjerg notes that these guidelines 
are characterized by putting practice before discourse (Flyvbjerg, 2001, p. 134). Kendall 
and Wickham (1999, pp. 39-41) discuss whether we should use the word discourse 
referring to an argument in an unpublished working paper by Ian Hunter. The point is that 
it could mean that people place too much emphasis on linguistics and language. In a 
similar discussion Prichard, Jones & Stablein argue that discourses are relatively 
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narrowly conceived in Foucault’s earlier work because it is based on official writings and 
records (2004, p. 222). This may be one of the reasons that Foucault changed 
terminology and switched terms from discourse to practice. This shift may also be viewed 
as an attempt to distance his writings from poststructuralism. I do not have any definitive 
answer here. I have a sense, however, that the use of the word discourse seems to be used 
to denote a group of concepts and practices such as a professional discipline or theoretical 
paradigm like organizational discourse. Practice seems to be linked to saying and doing 
things. Practice is, in other words, linked much more directly to the everyday activities of 
life. As such, practice and language games are more directly related. In this book I have 
chosen the concept of language games as the primary reference to everyday life activities 
because I believe that this concept is more precise than the rather popular but fluid 
concept “practice.” In any case, discourse and practice are parts of different 
methodological frameworks and this is the defining difference between discourse and 
practice put forward in this chapter. However, so as not to confuse the reader at this 
stage, I will not go into too much more detail at this stage on possible differences 
between discourse, practice or language games. All three concepts will be conceived in 
much the same manner, namely as a relation between the discursive and the non-
discursive as discussed in the previous chapter. Foucault’s concepts are used in this 
chapter to avoid confusion but these are perceived as concepts related to the different 
historical methods developed by Foucault and applied in this book for the analysis of 
language games. In this chapter a change also takes place in regard to which concept I 
make use of—in some sections, discourse is used, while practice is used in other 
sections. This is simply because they relate to different periods in Foucault’s authorship. 
 
Discourse/practice is the relationship between the discursive and the non-discursive and, 
as noted in Chapter 2, these two dimensions cannot be understood independently of each 
other. This relationship is also referred to as the relationship between the visible and the 
sayable (see also Kendall & Wickham, 1999, pp. 40-41), or the relationship between 
objects and speaking subjects (see Latour, 1996, p. viii). To understand the concept of 
discourse/practice is to acknowledge that it comprises both the discursive and the context 
in which, and of which, the discursive is part. This is not only relevant for understanding 
the discursive - it is also relevant to the emergence of the discursive. The discursive and 
the non-discursive are dialectically related to each other. They condition each other, 
develop each other but remain mutually exclusive. This perception of discourse/practice 
may appear to those unfamiliar with Foucault to be confusing at first glance, but is 
actually quite simple: 
 
”…all it suggests is that we need to describe the various bits and pieces that 
had to be in place to allow something else to be possible (and note here how 
this rather careful formulation allows you to avoid even the remotest 
suggestion that the emergent event or knowledge or whatever was 
necessary)” (Kendall & Wickham, 1999, p. 37). 
 
The way of speaking – the discursive – is conditioned on particular material 
circumstances and on what has been said and written before. As a consequence, the 
relationship between the discursive and the non-discursive is productive.  
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In Discipline and Punish (Foucault, 1979), for example, particular concepts and ways of 
speaking about criminality produce particular techniques and institutions such as the 
Panopticon, which in turn produce new concepts and ways of speaking. In The History of 
Sexuality (1978) new concepts and ways of speaking about sex produce techniques and 
architectures such as the schoolroom, which in turn produce new ways of speaking of and 
about sex. The discursive is only part of a material practice. Discourse/practice is, 
therefore, to be understood as a network of relations between concepts, ways of speaking, 
actors, activities, techniques, institutions and so on. The discursive comprises groups of 
concepts and ways of speaking, and their interrelations. It comprises a way of speaking of 
reality, which entails ways of understanding, approaching and solving problems. The 
function of the discursive is not only to communicate - it is also to classify, to separate, to 
evaluate and to measure. The discursive also contains explanations and representations. 
The non-discursive comprises such things as instruments, techniques, institutions (the 
hospital, the prison, and the laboratory), architectures, specific objects and instruments of 
verification, division of labor, machines, systems, tools, statistical data, and others. It 
also, however, includes people and bodies, which serve as objects of discursive: madness 
(Foucault, 1967), criminality (Foucault, 1979), and sexuality (Foucault, 1978). The 
relationship between the discursive and the non-discursive is central to understanding the 
concept of discourse/practice in Foucault’s writings. As mentioned above, it also means 
that concepts and ways of speaking always be understood in relation to the conditions of 
their emergence. 
 
There is another aspect to be considered here, which is perhaps not adequately described 
above, namely the aspect of historicity. This aspect emphasizes that discourse cannot be 
understood independently of what has been said and what has happened earlier. In 
Kendall & Wickham’s suggestion noted above, they state (within the brackets) that the:  
 
“….formulation allows you to avoid even the remotest suggestion that the 
emergent event or knowledge or whatever was necessary” (1999, p.37) . 
 
Events are not necessary, they are always only possible – that is, one possibility amongst 
many. In this connection, Kendall & Wickham’s further suggest that we should ”...Look 
for contingencies instead of causes” (1999, p. 5-9). Both archaeology and genealogy see 
history as destined by a particular rationality, which presses forward particular events. 
Haugaard distinguishes between “govern” and “determine” where Foucault’s position is 
very much more inclined to the former. When Foucault (1995), for example, speaks of 
rules of formation in The Archaeology of Knowledge, he means that these rules “govern” 
things that are said and done. Haugaard describes this as a process-of selection: 
  
“In the literal sense, actors can obviously say what they like – in this sense 
they are completely free – but not everything they might say will constitute a 
serious statement or truth” (1997, p. 56).  
 
This argument will become clearer in the following sections. It is important to emphasize 
historicity in relation to how change, including change in organizations, is perceived. It 
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suggests that what has been said and what has happened earlier forms part of the 
conditions that make it possible that a particular event occurs in the present. When the 
researcher looks for contingencies instead of causes, it means that she doesn’t conceive of 
this event as necessary. It is not the only event, which may occur. Historical events limit 
what can happen afterwards but this doesn’t imply that events are predestined in the sense 
that only one thing can happen—there is always the possibility that something else may 
happen. It follows that change is not causal, as too often represented in the mainstream 
organisation literature, but is contingent on what has happened before. This point is 
absolutely crucial to an understanding of Foucault’s authorship, and he never - I repeat 
never - deviates from this fundamental starting point. 
 
Archaeology 
Foucault’s methods are developed with the explicit purpose of confronting the values of 
everyday life with the hard facts of history. Archaeology is the first element in this 
strategy. Central to archaeology is the presence of the archive, which is the name for the 
collection of historical material from which the researcher conducts his analysis. The 
term archaeology gives the impression of a researcher who excavates forgotten, lost and 
buried - in other words marginalized - knowledge from this archive. Archaeology is the 
method used in Foucault’s early writings but this method is later substituted with 
genealogy. This does not mean, however, that Foucault leaves archaeology behind. While 
the concern for power is very explicit in genealogy, it is merely implicit in archaeology 
(Haugaard, 1997, p. 42). Archaeology is subsumed within genealogy; it is, in other 
words, subjected to genealogy’s tactical purposes. Archaeology must, therefore, be 
discussed here since a lot of what later becomes genealogical power analysis is grounded 
in archaeology. 
 
Archaeology is described in The Archaeology of Knowledge (Foucault, 1995). The 
emphasis on historicity is to be found here in the notion of discontinuity (Foucault, 1995, 
pp. 4-6). This term is developed as a contrast to sciences in which the purpose is to 
describe continuity and totality across time and space. In this sense, Foucault 
characterizes his methods as anti-scientific (Foucault, 1980, p. 83) because they oppose 
approaches in which the purpose is to describe the same – that is essential truth – in all 
differences (Foucault, 1995, p. 21). Rather, Foucault recommends that instead of viewing 
events as having an “…unqualified spontaneous value” (1995, p. 22), we have to accept 
that “…they concern only a population of dispersed events” (1995, p. 22). He suggests 
that we abandon the idea of a common theory and rationality which gathers different 
events under the same umbrella. Instead, events have to be studied as different events. In 
The Archaeology of Knowledge (Foucault, 1995, p. 27), he states that we are lead 
towards: 
 
 “…the project of a pure description of discursive events as the horizon for 
the search for the unities that form within it”.  
 
He makes two key points here: firstly, he characterizes archaeology as a pure description 
of discursive events; and secondly, it is a part of a search for “unities.” I will return to this 
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second point below. There is a third point, which is related to this pure description of 
discursive events. Events have to be seen and understood in the concrete historical 
context of their emergence in order to determine the conditions of their existence. 
 
”The analysis of the discursive field is orientated in a quite different way, we 
must grasp the statement in the exact specificity of its occurrence; determine 
its conditions of existence, fix at least its limits, establish its correlations with 
other statements that may be connected with it, and show what other forms of 
statements it excludes.” (Foucault, 1995, p. 28). 
 
That is, events must be seen in the exact specificity of their occurrence—they have an 
identity of their own. The organizing principle in the ordering of events is not a common 
rationality or truth but simply chronology and space. The archaeology is a method for 
organizing such events. In this respect, Foucault defines it as a non-interpretative 
discipline and as a systematic rewriting of history (Foucault, 1995, pp. 138-140). It is a 
“disinterested” (Flyvbjerg, 1991a, p. 98) rewriting of history. What he seeks through this 
rewriting of history is to lay down the rules of formation in a given discursive formation. 
A discursive formation is the name of a discipline, similar to “political economy”, 
“biology”, or “psycho-pathology.” The rules of formation are conditions of existence but 
also of coexistence, maintenance, modification and disappearance (Foucault, 1995, p. 38) 
 
When Foucault speaks of “rules of formation” in relation to the formation of objects, he 
speaks of the different conditions determining that certain discourses are put in the 
position that they are put in. This lends attention to why some discourses become 
dominating and obtain the status of truth, why others disappear and are perceived as 
illegitimate and so on. When Foucault asks the question, “Is it possible to lay down the 
rule to which their (the objects) appearance were subject?” (Foucault, 1995, p. 41), he 
means to describe the circumstances which made it possible that certain discourses 
became dominating, while others disappeared.  
 
He mentions three methodological guidelines: First “…the first surfaces of their 
emergence” have to be mapped in which the object is first considered a subject for 
categorization and conceptualization in relation to rationality and type of theory 
(Foucault, 1995, p. 41). It is an attempt to describe the origin of discourse, where it is first 
applied, and in relation to what kinds of problems. Second “…the authorities of 
delimitation” have to be described (Foucault, 1995, pp. 41-42). This describes how 
different actors are recognized as those who have the right to determine, define, name, 
establish and form an object. It concerns the question of who has the legitimate right to 
define truth, and how they are given this right. Third, “…the grids of specification” have 
to be analysed (Foucault, 1995, p. 42). These are the filters applied when different types – 
madness, sexuality, etc. – are divided, contrasted, related to, regrouped, classified and so 
on. The main concern here is with the content of the discourse. 
 
Such descriptions are, however, not enough. These will leave us with only single 
descriptions of the objects of discourse, not descriptions of relations. Furthermore, the 
actors who apply this discourse are not the guilty ones. They didn’t come up with it. 
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Foucault (1995, p. 43 describes this problem as uncovering how certain discourses 
became possible: 
 
”Such facts lie beyond the grasp of contemporary research: indeed the 
problem is how to decide what made them possible, and how these 
“discoveries” could leave to others that took them up, rectified them, 
modified them, or even disproved them”. 
 
The purpose is to uncover how certain discourses became possible and what makes it 
possible to apply discourse the way it is applied. To do this is to uncover a complex web 
of relations—such webs established between institutions, economic and social processes, 
behavioural patterns, norm systems, techniques, classification types, and ways of 
characterizing (Foucault, 1995, pp. 44-45). 
 
The purpose of archaeology, therefore, is to uncover the conditions for how certain 
discourses emerged, what made them possible, how they grew and how and why they 
changed. Foucault doesn’t assess whether these discourses are true or not, or indeed 
whether they are truer than others. The truth-value is of no interest whatsoever here. 
What is of interest is the discourse as a historically conditioned way of speaking of and 
understanding objects. In this way truth and justice are viewed as historically 
conditioned. They are not fundamentally true. By uncovering the historical conditions of 
conceptions of truth and justice, these conceptions are questioned. 
 
“To define these objects without reference to the ground, the foundation of 
things, but by relating them to the body of rules that enable them to form as 
objects of a discourse and thus constitute the conditions of their historical 
appearance.” (Foucault, 1995, pp. 47-48). 
 
This is the overall purpose of archaeology - and this purpose is repeated in genealogy and 
in the analysis of power. Discourses are questioned by describing how they emerged and 
from whence they came (the first surfaces of their emergence), how they gained their 
legitimacy (the authorities of delimitation) and what their concrete operation and content 
is (the grids of specification). The way people speak of and understand events are always 
conditioned on something, something which happened before. It is not the result of some 
underlying truth or rationality. Archaeology shares these basic premises with genealogy. 
Archaeology is also applied in order to question the values of everyday life as its purpose 
is to question discourses from within.  
 
Foucault mentions three more concrete methodological guidelines in relation to the 
analysis of concrete situations. The first guideline is to determine who is speaking. Who 
is accorded the right to use such language? Who is qualified to do so? Who derives from 
it his status and prestige and from whom does he get the assurance or presumption that 
what he says is true (Foucault, 1995, p. 50)? This involves determining from where the 
criteria of competence come from; justice, tradition, systems, norms and so on. The 
second question is to describe the institutional sites from where discourse operates and 
from where discourse gains its legitimacy and purpose (Foucault, 1995, p. 51). Finally, 
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we have to describe the positions that are possible for individuals to occupy in concrete 
situations (Foucault, 1995, p. 52). What part is the individual able to play?  
 
Archaeological description is thus a systematic rewriting of history in order to determine 
the conditions of existence of a given discursive formation. It is a systematic rewriting of 
history in terms of: 
 
• Mapping the first surfaces of their emergence: Where does the discourse come 
from? 
• Describing the authorities of delimitation: How are different actors recognized as 
those who have the right to determine, define, name, establish and form an object? 
• Describing the grids of specification: What is the content of the discourse? What 
language does it use? 
• Describing how the discourse became possible: What relations between 
institutions, economic and social processes, behavioural patterns, norm systems, 
techniques, classification types, and ways of characterizing made the discourse 
possible? 
 
These are the key questions of archaeology. In term of guidelines for analysing single 
situations, the questions are: 
 
• Who is speaking: Who is accorded the right, who is qualified etc? 
• From which institutional sites does the discourse gain its legitimacy and purpose? 
• Which positions are possible for the individual to occupy? 
 
This is a systematic rewriting of history in terms of chronology, actor, and context (see 
also Jørgensen, 2002). This systematic rewriting of history is adopted by genealogical 
power analysis and subjected to the latter’s tactical purposes. It is clear from the above 
description that the archaeology also operates – albeit implicitly - with a conception of 
power. The archaeological analysis is the analysis of the foundation for the presence of 
phenomena such as inequality, imbalance, difference, domination and control in society. 
All the questions posed by archaeology lead us in the direction of power. 
 
There are, however, a number of aspects of archaeology, which are somewhat confusing 
and probably part of the reasons why Foucault turns to genealogy. As mentioned earlier, 
the concept of discourse could lead readers to place too much emphasis on linguistics and 
language. But there are more serious problems in addition to the fact that The 
Archaeology of Knowledge is a very difficult and very theoretical read. In any case a 
plethora of new terminology is introduced (Haugaard, 1997, p. 47). This makes it more 
difficulty than necessary both in terms of reading, and particularly using, archaeology. 
But there are other more serious methodological problems in archaeology. After his 
critique of the discourses of science for being unitary, systematising and totalising, it 
seems rather curious that the alternative concepts presented by Foucault are “discursive 
formation,” “rules of formation,” or even “systems of dispersion.” As noted by Haugaard 
(1997, p. 55), Foucault argues that despite his rejection of unities, he operates with 
subdivisions. These subdivisions are governed by rules of formation. As mentioned 
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above, govern should not be understood as deterministic but rather as rules, which govern 
“…what can and cannot be said as part of the language of truth” (Haugaard, 1997, p. 56). 
Neither should rules be understood as a deep common structure to be found underneath 
statements (see Haugaard, p. 55). Foucault, however, goes to great lengths to actually 
describe or even define these rules of formation. But since these are extremely complex, 
The Archaeology becomes longer and longer without ever getting closer to a workable 
definition of rules apart from that the fact that they are historically conditioned. His 
attempts to define a unity (see Foucault, 1995, pp. 31-39), in particular, are more 
confusing than illuminating because unities are described as paradoxical, inconsistent, 
fairly loose structures and full of gaps. In any case, I think he tries to express and to 
define more clearly these tacit rules, and in the process of trying to define rule, unity, etc., 
he, in my opinion, paralyses history instead of allowing history to move on and to 
change. This means that archaeology becomes static. The discursive formations become 
almost as static as the unities opposed by archaeology. The subdivisions almost become 
closed systems of what Haugaard calls “…mutually systematically relationally self-
constituting truths” (Haugaard, 1997, p. 66).  
 
“…while this makes absolute sense for a hypothetically static episteme, what 
is missing is any sense of dynamic locus upon which to locate change” 
(Haugaard, 1997, p. 66). 
 
The unconditional purity is a related problem. Descriptions are never pure but contain 
choices, selections and interpretations. A pure description of events makes it impossible 
to describe relations or connections between events, between actors, or between 
institutions. When it is impossible to do this, it is also impossible to describe 
transformation and change. Such phenomena are about relations: relations between 
actions, events, actors, institutions, that can only be captured through interpretation. To 
suggest that these interpretations have to be carried out on the basis of detailed 
descriptions of events with reference to the actual conditions in which these events 
emerge, are not the same as suggesting any kind of purity inherent in these descriptions. 
To claim purity also means that the purpose of analysis becomes very unclear; it cannot 
be anything but unclear. Thus, the intentions of questioning our ideals and presumptions 
of truth and justice are, in other words, only implicit in the archaeology. It is not entirely 
clear to what degree these considerations comprise some of Foucault’s reasons for 
leaving archaeology and turning to genealogy—and, of course, to power. It is probably 
appropriate, however, to see genealogy as a resolution of these methodological problems 
(Haugaard, 1997, p. 66). With the introduction of genealogy and power, Foucault is 
equipped with a stronger, more focused and tactical vocabulary than in his previous 
reliance on archaeology alone.  
 
Genealogy 
Foucault notes the distinction between archaeology and genealogy as follows: 
 
”If we were to characterise it in two terms, then ”archaeology” would be the 
appropriate methodology of this analysis of local discursivities, and 
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”genealogy” would be the tactics whereby, on the basis of the descriptions of 
these local discursivities, the subjected knowledges which were thus released 
would be brought into play” (Foucault, 1980, p. 85). 
 
Genealogy is the tactics by which archaeological descriptions are brought into play. The 
tactics is to question the values of everyday life. Genealogy is Foucault’s method in 
Discipline and Punish (1979) and The History of Sexuality (1978), both of which are 
written in the period after Madness and Civilization (1967) and The Order of Things 
(1970). An early description of genealogy appears, however, in the article Nietzsche, 
Genealogy, History (1984a), published in 1971 (see note in Foucault, 1984a, p. 76). In 
this article, Foucault describes the foundation of genealogy as Nietzsche’s writings. It is 
also Nietzsche, who originally used the term “grey” about genealogy (Nietzsche, 1992b, 
p. 457; on this point see also Jørgensen, 2002, p. 42, and Flyvbjerg, 2002, pp. 113-114). 
This origin is not apparent from Nietzsche, Genealogy, History, even if Foucault starts by 
characterizing genealogy as grey (Foucault, 1984a, p. 76). The importance of this article 
cannot be overestimated. There are few places in Fouclult’s massive ouvre in which the 
link to Nietzsche is described so deeply. In this article, Foucault describes genealogy as a 
way of questioning the values of everyday life by means of different uses of history. 
Foucault also introduces the concepts, directly linked with power, of “Herkunft” and 
“Entstehung.” The exploration of “Herkunft” and “Entstehung” constitutes the 
genealogical analysis (Foucault, 1984a, p. 86). Both concepts are absolutely central to 
understanding the unique historical method, which is linked to Foucault’s power analysis. 
 
The concept of discourse is now substituted with, or superceded by, the concept of 
practice in genealogy. This serves to eliminate some misunderstandings linked with the 
use of discourse. As noted above, however, practice is perceived as the relation between 
the discursive and the non-discursive. The part it plays in relation to the analysis of 
relations of power is the important characteristic of genealogy. It seeks to bring 
“subjected knowledges” into play. The purpose is described as follows in Discipline and 
Punish (Foucault, 1979): 
 
”I would like to write the history of this prison, with all the political 
investments of the body that it gathers together in closed architecture. Why? 
Simply because I am interested in the past? No - if one means by that writing 
a history of the past in terms of the present. Yes - if one means writing the 
history of the present.” (Foucault, 1979, p. 31). 
 
To perform a genealogy in other words is to write “the history of the present”—which 
means that we use the past to describe the present. Genealogy is not about the past, it is 
about the present. This includes why we think, act and interact in the ways that we think, 
act and interact. It is to try to see how history influences our daily practices because our 
ways of thinking, acting and judging are descended from history, but not a manifestation 
of history. Genealogy also connects the concept of power (discussed in more detail 
below) with these everyday practices, and this power analysis aims at showing or 
revealing power in how we deal with everyday life. As Hardy and Clegg (1996, p. 631) 
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put it, power is “…embedded in the fibre and fabric of everyday life”. Power now 
becomes stronger, relevant, and concrete.  
 
Genealogical analysis aims at questioning the present by means of history. It seeks to 
make people conscious of who they are, where they come from and why things are the 
way they are. Nietzsche, in his introduction to The Genealogy of Morals notes that: 
 
“We are unknown to ourselves, we men of knowledge – and with good 
reason. We have never sought ourselves – how could it happen that we should 
ever find ourselves?” (Nietzsche, 1992b, p. 451). 
 
Through the use of history, Foucault wishes to bring subjected knowledges into play in 
order to show that things need not be so. History is his critique (Haugaard, 1997, p. 44). 
Genealogy is rather cynical in this respect and seeks also to bring forward the darker 
sides of history which provides it with critical intent. The darker sides are those events 
that people might like to forget because they are embarrassing, shameful or just do not fit 
with their constructed images of themselves. People are not necessarily polite, civilized, 
noble, pragmatic or reasonable. Genealogy is open for the worst case to occur (Flyvbjerg, 
2001, p. 95). People can be evil, immoral, obnoxious, selfish and capable of doing 
whatever it takes to promote their own intentions or interests. Genealogy reveals that the 
concept of liberty is an invention of the ruling classes and not necessarily the basic 
condition of man (Foucault, 1979, pp. 78-79)—an insight that is, of course, open to 
challenge from other discourses. It reveals that rationality was born in an altogether 
reasonable fashion – from chance (Foucault, 1984a, p. 78). Genealogy doesn’t see history 
as necessarily logical or continuously directed to improvement and enlightenment. 
  
”…historical beginnings are lowly: not in the sense of modest or discreet 
steps of a dove, but derisive and ironic, capable of undoing every infatuation” 
(Foucault, 1984a, p. 79).  
 
Power should also be understood in an equally less glorious and more mundane manner. 
Power does not derive from the king. The constitution of social life is, on the contrary, 
derived from “…a complex set of petty and ignoble power relations” (Haugaard, 1997, p. 
43). Power is the consequence of local strategies and is the overall effect of petty 
confrontations between actors fighting over what is true and what is just (see Haugaard, 
1997, pp. 68-69). Genealogy is to write “wirkliche Historie” (Foucault, 1984a, p. 87; see 
also Flyvbjerg, 2001, pp. 114-115). The starting point is a concrete description of 
everyday practices, where each is described as having its own identity. ”It must record 
the singularity of events outside any monotonous finality” (Foucault, 1984a, p. 76). 
Genealogy requires patience and knowledge of details (Foucault, 1984a, pp. 78-79). 
Genealogy is patiently documentary - as is archaeology. It doesn’t, however, assume to 
be pure. It is tactical in bringing out the darker sides of history.  
 
Genealogy, as a special kind of historical analysis, is described by means of Nietzsche’s 
concepts: Urkunft, Herkunft and Entstehung (Jørgensen, 2002). Urkunft is consistent with 
unities like “science,” “ideology,” “theory” or “domain of objectivity.” It is used to 
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describe the “…the miraculous origin” (Foucault, 1984a, p. 77) at which a given 
rationality or truth is established and thence has some determining effect on everything 
that comes after. Events are thus a manifestation of history and this common truth. As a 
consequence, events are not perceived as having an identity of their own. Nietzsche and 
Foucault describe Urkunft as an invention, an artifice, and a sleight-of-hand or even as 
black magic (Foucault, 1984a, p. 77), which is rather useful, if not very satisfactory, 
when one cannot explain facts otherwise. Instead, genealogical analysis is linked to 
Herkunft and Entstehung. 
 
The English word for Herkunft is descent. It emphasizes the historicity of words and 
actions. History influences, limits and makes possible. But at the same time it is not 
history, which repeats itself. Events are in other words not reflections or manifestations 
of history: 
 
”…rather, it seeks the subtle, singular, and subindividual marks that might 
possibly intersect in them to form a network that is difficult to unravel. Far 
from being a category of resemblance, this origin allows the sorting out of 
different traits…” (Foucault, 1984a, p. 81). 
 
The analysis of descent is the analysis of “numberless beginnings...(which)...permits the 
dissociation of the self” (Foucault, 1984a, p. 81). Herkunft is thus associated with the use 
of history as being “dissociative.” The “self” - and the values linked to it – is in other 
words a historical construction, which has numberless beginnings. Thus, the self is not a 
unity but is fragmented, differentiated and shaped by accidents: 
 
”…to follow the complex course of descent is to maintain passing events in 
their proper dispersion; it is to identify the accidents, the minute deviations – 
or conversely, the complete reversals – the errors, the false appraisals, and the 
faulty calculations that gave birth to those things that continue to exist and 
have value for us: it is to discover that truth and being do not lie at the root of 
what we know and what we are, but the exteriority of accidents.” (Foucault, 
1984a, p. 81). 
 
In genealogical analyses, descent is inscribed in the body, in nervous systems, 
temperament, systems of digestion and so on—“its task is to expose a body totally 
imprinted by history and process of history’s destruction of the body” (Foucault, 1984a, 
pp. 82-83). 
 
The English word for Entstehung is emergence. In the same way as descent is not be 
considered as an undisturbed continuity, neither is emergence the final part of historical 
development. It is only an episode in a series of “subjugations” (Foucault, 1984a, p. 83). 
The descriptions of emergence in many ways resemble Foucault’s descriptions of power. 
Genealogy, for example, “…seeks to re-establish the various systems of subjection: not 
the anticipatory power of meaning, but the hazardous play of dominations” (Foucault, 
1984a, p. 83). Concepts such as subjugation, subjection and domination were already 
used by Foucault in 1971. Emergence is also linked with force, which, in turn, 
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strengthens the resemblance between genealogy and power. The purpose of an analysis of 
emergence is to delineate the interaction between different forces: 
 
“Emergence is always produced through a particular stage of forces. The 
analysis of the Entstehung must delineate this interaction. The struggle these 
forces wage against each other or against adverse circumstances, and the 
attempt to avoid degeneration and regain strength by dividing these forces 
against themselves.” (Foucault, 1984a, pp. 83-84). 
 
“Force” and “struggle” are central to any analysis of emergence. The latter is the scene on 
which different forces meet face-to-face (Foucault, 1984a, p. 84). While descent 
describes the character of the instinct and its inscription in the body, emergence is “…a 
place of confrontation” (Foucault, 1984a, p. 84). Emergence is the result of a relation 
between forces. As a consequence, no one is responsible for emergence; “…no one can 
glory in it, since it always occurs in the interstice” (Foucault, 1984a, p. 85). To reiterate, 
emergence is always a relation between forces and no one is responsible for it. The 
actions of people have to be viewed in interaction with particular material circumstances 
and other actors. As a consequence, emergence is never finished or complete. It moves 
through new relations and new confrontations, which carry with them new objects and 
new ways of speaking. According to Foucault, this means that there is only one drama, 
namely “…the endlessly repeated play of dominations” (Foucault, 1984a, p. 85).  
 
”The domination of certain men over others lead to the differentiation of 
values; class domination generates the idea of liberty; and the forceful 
appropriation of things necessary to survival and the imposition of a duration 
not intrinsic to them account for the origin of logic.” (Foucault, 1984a, p. 85). 
 
This endless play of dominations is fixed, through history, in rituals, in procedures, in 
norms and rules, which prescribe truth and justice. To suggest that civilized societies are 
equal to the rejection of violence and war would be very naïve. Violence, war, and the 
bloody confrontations are rather installed in the rule- and norm systems, which go from 
dominance to dominance (Foucault, 1984a, p. 85) and produce inequality and difference 
in the possibilities of defining truth and justice. 
 
Genealogical analysis is the analysis of the relationship between descent and emergence. 
Descent is embodied and living history and is practiced passionately and emotionally in 
the arguments and actions of individuals in everyday life. It is rich in motives, intentions, 
interests, passions, feelings and hence values. Emergence, on the other hand, is the result 
of the interaction between these different forces. The result is the manifestation of values 
in norms, rituals, rules, procedures and traditions which prescribe truth and justice. The 
key problem here is that emergence is not the result of an interaction between equals. In 
emergence, the participants are different people with different intentions and with 
different opportunities to produce such emergence. It follows that people have different 
possibilities of influencing history, of writing history and of creating the history of the 
future. 
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Genealogy is explicitly directed against this problem. Emergence produces inequality, 
difference, domination and control, which in turn produce emergence. The writing of 
history depends on relations of power. The winners write history. Contesting arguments, 
viewpoints, meanings and actions are lost and forgotten. The latter comprise the 
subjected knowledges. They are also referred to as marginalized voices in Foucault’s 
writings. The writing of history - whether it is in books, in stories, in narratives, in 
techniques, in procedures, in rules, in concepts, in sentences and so on contains a specific 
version of what is true and what is just. Values are productive and create development but 
at the same time people are also prisoners of their values. This makes it very difficult to 
see other possibilities and openings. This is precisely the point of genealogy. Foucault 
gives us history in order to provide us with the possibility of reflecting on the self 
(Haugaard, 1997, p. 44). 
 
Genealogy seeks to overcome the problem of moral imprisonment by writing wirkliche or 
effective history as distinct from traditional history. The claim that genealogical analysis 
is not produced in order to understand but with the intention of cutting off the roots 
should also be understood in this sense. 
 
“This is because knowledge is not made for understanding: it is made for 
cutting” (Foucault, 1984a, p. 88). 
 
“Cutting” means to shake and disturb the foundation: what we consider true and proper 
including presumptions of who we are and where we come from (see Foucault, 1984a, 
pp. 87-88). As a consequence, effective history is “…without constants” (Foucault, 
1984a, p. 87). The focus on values is now made explicit here. A genealogy is conducted 
in order to shake and disturb the values used to understand, evaluate and judge. “To cut 
off the roots” implies that the emergence of our concepts, words, methods and tools is 
different from what people may think. People are not the final product of a process 
towards emancipation and enlightenment—but merely the results of accidents. Events are 
not part of a continuous or rational development—an event is what it is and must be 
analysed in relation to its most unique characteristics (Foucault, 1984a, p. 88). An event, 
therefore, has an identity of its own and must be analysed as such (see also Jørgensen, 
2002, p. 30). The forces operating in history are not controlled by one destiny or other 
forms of regulatory mechanisms. Such forces react in relation to accidental events or 
conflicts (Foucault, 1984a, p. 88). Thus, the difference between effective history and 
traditional history is that the former doesn’t conceive of history as a planned, rational and 
progressive process written by noble people with noble and rational intentions. History is, 
on the contrary, a discontinuous and accidental process written by many different people 
with many different and very often contradictory intentions. The whole spectre of human 
characteristics is to be represented in effective history: Nobility, generosity, heroic deeds, 
reason and vision—but also war, massacres, blood, conflicts, violence, exploitation and 
so forth. The purpose of effective history is to write a more varied history of the present 
and the social changes that have lead to it. Understanding is thus a much deeper and more 
complex understanding of the phenomena of the present instead of the narrow and often 
one-eyed understanding provided by traditional history. Traditional historians are 
dangerous, because they attempt to hide behind the “objective viewpoint” and present 
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such history as the ultimately true version. This way of writing is, according to Foucault, 
demagogical and speaks to the lowest or basest in people: 
 
”What is the source of history? It comes from the plebs. To whom is it 
addressed? To the plebs. And its discourse strongly resembles the 
demagogue’s refrain: “No one is greater than you and anyone who presumes 
to get the better of you – you who are good – is evil.” (Foucault, 1984a, p. 
91). 
 
An explicit rejection of traditional history is fundamental for the genealogist. The former 
presents history as neutral and objective, while the purpose of genealogy is precisely to 
bring forward the feelings, the passions, the motives and the intentions in the history of 
the present.  
 
Foucault summarizes the purposes of genealogy in three different – albeit interconnected 
– uses of history: the parodic, the dissociative, and the sacrificial. These are now 
discussed in more detail than in the brief introduction presented earlier. 
 
The parodic: The first use of history concerns getting “behind” history and avoiding 
being seduced by the web of stories, legends, myths, and narratives, all of which conceal 
the emergence of practices. Genealogical analysis seeks to go beyond imagined truths 
and question the legitimacy of practices. These imagined truths include, for example, 
stories of heroes and scoundrels, rational explanations, romanticism, images and so on. 
Genealogical analysis seeks to tear off such masks and map actual events in their correct 
chronological order, in the proper context, and with a proper description of who is 
involved, and what part they play. This includes the winners, the losers, the marginalized 
and the privileged. Genealogy, therefore, will tell a different, more detailed and diverse 
story and thereby shake the one-sided imagery of, for example, an organization to its 
core. The importance of the parodic use of history may be illuminated by drawing on the 
recent emphasis placed on narrative and story telling in organization studies (Boje, 2001; 
Czarniawska, 1997, 1999). For both Boje and Czarniawska narrative is a way of making 
sense of reality. Narrative provides a means of constructing meanings from what may 
otherwise appear as a flowing heterogeneously amorphous amalgam of events, images 
and symbols. In this sense, every actor is a story teller. Moreover, every word, symbol or 
action has a story to tell; such stories, of course, are dependant on the story teller. It 
follows that narrative always originates from something that precedes narrative; Boje 
(2001) prefers the term antenarrative. Antenarrative emphasizes that narrative is 
constructed from equivocal, fragmented, inconsistent and loosely coupled bits, pieces and 
fragments that may be interpreted in many, many different ways. As such narrative and 
story depend heavily on the story teller’s position. It depends on time, place and mind 
(TwoTrees, 1997; Boje, 2001). Such positioning also indicates that narratives and stories 
must also heavily depend on power relations. The writing of “Wirkliche Historie” is 
precisely an attempt at remaining faithful to the spirit of antenarrative; this is essential in 
order to avoid being seduced by particular narratives and stories constructed by story 
tellers with specific intentions and interests which are masquerades or disguises of 
history. This inconsistency between the masquerade and factual events has been well 
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documented in some recent studies. Flyvbjerg (1991b) demonstrates, amongst others, 
how the decision of locating a bus terminal in the city of Aalborg is taken before the 
official decision-making processes and investigations had even started. Similarly, Latour 
(1996) demonstrates how none of the actors involved in the Aramis-project were 
interested in the whole project but only took an interest in bits and pieces of it. In reality 
this meant that the official goals, which were the foundation of the economic funding, 
were not consistent with reality. Further, much of the organizational literature may be 
subjected to genealogical analysis thereby providing us with a different picture of what 
this kind of literature can be used for. O’Connor’s case study (1999) of how the The 
Human Relations School and The Harvard Business School grew to become powerful 
institutions in organization and management thought demonstrates clearly how the 
emergence of theories and concepts are themselves saturated with relations of power. 
This story is quite different from the ordinary story of the Hawthorne investigations (For 
example, see Homans, 1966). The emergence of these institutions is presented as the 
result of an alliance between powerful businessmen, such as John D. Rockefeller and 
others, as a reaction to the prevailing fear of Marxism and the labor movement. 
 
The dissociative: The second use of history resembles the parodic in many ways but is 
more closely linked with identity. Power analysis demonstrates the complexity, the 
contradictions and the paradoxes in relation to who people are and how they have become 
who they are. The dissociative use of history reveals that people are part of history and as 
such are subjected to influences and pressures to behave in particular ways. It 
demonstrates how people are capable of practically anything in order to promote their 
own intentions and interests. They cooperate, they work hard, they see the visions, and 
are capable of making tough decisions when their backs are pressed against the wall. But 
they also argue, they struggle, they fight, they manipulate, they exploit, they deceive and 
they lie. The dissociative use of history reveals the whole spectrum of human 
characteristics and human history. It doesn’t allow us to forget the darker sides in the 
panoply of human identity and integrity. The dissociative use of history is directed 
towards peoples’ image of themselves. Their ‘own image’ is conceived of as a 
construction and a mask, which may only provide a one-eyed and maybe even a 
narcissistic representation of who people really are. It is backed up by constructed myths, 
sagas, stories and narratives. In genealogical terms this own image is, if in part, often a 
form of self-deception. First of all it tends to exclude the darker sides of one’s history, the 
sides that people don’t wish to see or to acknowledge. There are probably numerous 
different reasons for people not wanting to see these sides of their own histories. They 
may simply produce images that are illegitimate in terms of how people want to be 
perceived – as such they may even have undesirable political consequences. But it may 
also be caused by the simple fact that some peoples’ realities are almost unbearable. I 
find my inspiration here in Gabriel’s psychoanalytic story telling approach (Gabriel, 
2000; see also Pritchard, Jones and Stablein, 2004, p 219). In this way imagined identities 
– and thus sagas, stories and narratives – are a way out, so to speak, a way of coping with 
difficult everyday realities. They provide a way of maintaining a human face that allows 
the suffering individual to rebuff rationalization, control, oppression and exploitation. 
Without going into further depth on the psychology of the self  the main point here is that 
the own image of self is a potential cage from within which people cannot learn anything 
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new. Narrow-mindedness, intolerance and stupidity are the results. Genealogical analysis 
is directed towards shaking this own image by providing a more varied historical analysis 
of who people really are and where they come from. 
 
The sacrificial: The third use of history demonstrates how actions in organizations 
originate and are driven from peoples’ intentions, interests, passions, feelings and will. 
Foucault refers to this as “the will to power” (Foucault, 1984a, p. 89) or “the will to 
knowledge”, which is, of course, inspired by Nietzsche (Nietzsche, 1992b, pp. 514-515). 
The “will” penetrates the production of knowledge. Knowledge, therefore, is anything but 
neutral, objective or value free’. Knowledge is saturated with passions, interests and 
intentions and exists in a continuous struggle and confrontation with other’s passions, 
interests and intentions. Violence, blood, conflict, dominance and slavery are embedded 
in the production of knowledge – not liberty, equality or fraternity (see also Foucault, 
1984a, p. 96). The sacrificial use of history perceives social processes as driven by people 
with different passions, intentions, interests and feelings. 
 
“But if it examines itself and if, more generally, it interrogates the various 
forms of scientific consciousness in its history, it finds that all these forms 
and transformations are aspects of the will to knowledge: instinct, passion, 
the inquisitors devotion, cruel subtlety, and malice” (Foucault, 1984a, p. 95). 
 
Developments are not the result of any objective truth. The sacrificial use of history 
demonstrates how practices in organizations are the results of many small force relations 
which interact in particular ways to create the larger patterns. Foucault’s power analysis 
is unique since it not only assumes that reality is socially constructed—it also 
demonstrates in a very deep fashion how it is socially constructed. 
 
The three uses of history are very closely linked and are mutually inter-dependent. A 
sacrificial use of history, for example, carries with it the parodic and the dissociative. It is 
also impossible to speak of a parodic use of history without showing how reality is 
socially constructed. As such power analysis almost always contains aspects from all 
three uses of history. It follows that I will not distinguish as sharply between these 
aspects of power in the ensuing case analysis as in this more descriptive outline. The 
analysis concentrates on showing how reality is socially constructed - this is the 
sacrificial use of history, but it also implies the two other uses of history. The aim is to 
construct an alternative memory and this demands that all three are incorporated in any 
substantive Foucauldian analysis. 
 
Genealogy and power 
We have seen that both archaeology and genealogy incorporate a conception of power—
and that both methods are aimed at questioning the values of everyday life. An unequal 
distribution of privilege, advantage, domination, and control is embedded and embodied 
in everyday life. Therefore, both methods are really an analysis of the values on which 
power relations are founded. This aim is implicit in archaeology but explicit in genealogy 
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where it is much more clearly linked to power. Relations between genealogy and power 
are further clarified in this section.  
 
These relations are described, amongst others, in two seminal lectures, which took place 
in January 1976. These lectures were later transcribed and published in the essay Two 
Lectures (Foucault, 1980) where power is described in much the same fashion as 
Entstehung in genealogy, namely as “…a relation of force” (Foucault, 1980, p. 89). This 
makes Foucault’s power concept distinct from a juridical or liberal understanding of 
power, and also from the economic analysis of power presented by Marx (see Foucault, 
1980, p. 88). From both juridical and economic perspectives, power is perceived as a 
commodity which may be exchanged as such. Foucault calls these perceptions “contract-
power” (Foucault, 1980, p. 91). In contract-power, economy is at a higher level than 
power in the sense that power is always analysed in terms of the relations of production 
(Foucault, 1980, p. 88). Foucault suggests instead that power be analysed as a relation of 
force. Concretely this means that one analyses power in terms of “…struggle, conflict 
and war” (Foucault, 1980, p. 90). The difference is central to Foucauldian analysis. As 
mentioned above, archaeology lacks any sense of change. In genealogy, on the other 
hand, Foucault situates change and development in a theory of power. But again, this is 
not to be understood as either a teleological or a subject-centred solution. The social 
subject is neither given the power to shape history, nor is power seen as a core essence. It 
is not the individual who possesses power (subject-centred solution). Neither is it the 
economy which determines the course of history (Marx’ essential solution) (Haugaard, 
1997, pp. 66-67). Power is not the motor of history: according to Foucault “Power is 
located at the level of struggle and manifest in its effects” (Haugaard, 1997, p. 67).  
 
When Foucault speaks of power in Two Lectures, he speaks of war. War is thus a good 
example of how Foucault perceives the relations between genealogy and power. Foucault 
describes power by means of a reversal of Clausewitz’ claim that “…war is politics 
continued by other means…” to “power is war, a war continued by other means” 
(Foucault, 1980, p. 90; see also Foucault, 1993, p. 334). The key point is to view power 
relations as historically constructed and war as eternal in the sense that peace doesn’t 
suspend the effects of war or neutralize imbalances (see also Haugaard, 1997, pp. 67-69). 
 
”The role of political power, on this hypothesis, is perpetually to reinscribe this 
relation to a form of unspoken warfare; to reinscribe it in social institutions, in 
economic inequalities, in language, in the bodies themselves of each and everyone 
of us” (Foucault, 1980, p. 90). 
 
Social institutions, including organizations, should, in the same way, be perceived as 
places or loci characterized by unbroken “warfare.” Conflicts and inequalities are 
inscribed in the structure of the organization, its distribution of rights and obligations, its 
language and in the bodies of the participants. Inequality is within people, in their ways 
of perceiving reality, their ways of working in the world, their ways of communicating, 
and so on. Political battles – changes in the relations, support and amplifications of 
certain tendencies within this “civil peace”, as Foucault puts it (Foucault, 1980, p. 91), 
should be seen as nothing other than the continuation of warfare. 
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”They should, that is to say, be understood as episodes, factions and 
displacements in that same war. Even when one writes the history of this war, 
it is always the history of this war that one is writing” (Foucault, 1980, p. 91).  
 
Such conflicts and battles continue in the sense that the organization - its structure, its 
technology, its culture or in its general ways of operating – is founded on inequalities and 
confrontations. Power is, therefore, communicated from everywhere. This conception of 
power and its foundation is known as Nietzsche’s hypothesis, which accordingly claims 
that the foundation for a relation of power is the relation of hostile forces (Foucault, 
1980, p. 91). Repression is the simple effect and continuation of a dominating relation - it 
is a realization of the eternal relation of force (Foucault, 1980, p. 92). Organizations are, 
in the same manner, always emerging from the relations between hostile forces. These 
relations are characterized by inequality, dominance and difference. The organization is 
in a permanent state of imbalance. This doesn’t mean that the relationship is perceived as 
illegitimate or untrue by some the participants. On the contrary, they subject themselves 
to the social rules and the implicit perceptions of truth and justice. The values of these 
social rules – that is, the values of everyday life – are what Foucault wishes to question.  
 
The reader will note that I have from time to time used the terms truth and justice 
throughout this chapter and, indeed, throughout the whole book. This is because Foucault 
in Two Lectures denotes as his primary interest the triangle power, truth and right (see 
Foucault, 1980, pp. 92-93). Foucault is interested in two systems at the level of society. 
The first is the system of justice, which is supposed to guarantee concepts such as 
freedom, liberty, sovereignty, democracy and obligations – that is the right. The other is 
the scientific system, which has to do with the production of truth. Foucault perceives 
these systems as defined by relations of power. Truth and justice do not define relations 
of power—but the other way around. 
 
I now turn towards Foucault’s formulation that power is first and foremost a relation of 
force. Foucault describes this in more detail in the section called Method in The History 
of Sexuality – Volume I (Foucault, 1993, pp. 333-341). More specifically, power is 
described as a gathering of a multiplicity of force relations, which are immanent in the 
sphere in which they operate and constitute their own organization.  
 
“…that power must be understood in the first instance as the multiplicity of 
force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which 
constitute their own organization; …” (Foucault, 1993, pp. 333-334). 
 
Power comes from everywhere. It doesn’t start in one central point from whence 
secondary and related forms will emanate. Power is a gathering of many different force 
relations. ”Power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it 
comes from everywhere” (Foucault, 1993, p. 334) - from the immanent relations in the 
economic and productive processes to the relations in the smallest elements of society – 
relations in the family, in the school, in the group. Power is simply: 
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 ”…the overall effect that emerges from all these mobilities… …as the 
process which, through ceaseless struggles and confrontations, transforms, 
strengthens or reverses them; …” (Foucault, 1993, p. 334). 
 
Power emerges through the confrontations and the battles between all these different 
forces embedded and embodied in the everyday life of social and economic institutions at 
all levels of society. Power is the support that these force relations find in each other:  
 
”…as the support which these force relations find in one another, thus 
forming a chain or a system, or on the contrary, the disjunctions and 
contradictions which isolate them from one another; …” (Foucault, 1993, p. 
334).  
 
These force relations are embedded in concrete strategies and institutions, in the 
formulation of the law and the constitution and in different social forms of domination 
and control. Even if power is described here as a relational concept, it has very concrete 
manifestations. 
 
“…and lastly as the strategies in which they take effect, whose general design 
or institutional crystallization is embodied in the state apparatus, in the 
formulation of the law, in the various social hegemonies” (Foucault, 1993, p. 
334). 
 
Power is a concept which is put together or constructed from multiple forms. It is a more 
or less loose network which emerges from many different forces. How loose or tight this 
network is and how much it includes or excludes cannot be described beforehand. What 
is important is to maintain the unique features of Foucault’s power analysis, namely its 
bottom-up character and that it is first and foremost considered as a relation of force. This 
means that it is cynical, senseless and cold in the registration and description of the 
manifestation of different practices, which through their interactions, constitute the 
relations of power. These interactions and relations of power create reality. Elden (2001, 
p. 106) refers to the fact that Foucault uses the French verb “pouvoir” about power – a 
verb meaning “to be able.” This means that Foucault attempts to capture the creative and 
productive sense of power rather than merely the repressive sense.  
 
“We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative 
terms: It includes, it represses, it censors, it abstracts, it masks, it conceals. In 
fact power produces; it produces reality, it produces domains and objects and 
rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him 
belong to this production” (Foucault, 1979, p. 194). 
 
Relations of power are not first and foremost repressive. They create reality including our 
perceptions of truth and justice. Because of its compound character of many different 
hostile forces, power is also a network, which continuously emerges and is under 
development. There are always internal tensions, which, in turn, might evolve into new 
relations of power: 
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”It is the moving substrate of force relations which, by virtue of their 
inequality, constantly engender states of power, but the latter are always local 
and unstable” (Foucault, 1993, p. 334). 
 
In this connection, it should be noted that words and things, in Foucault’s power analysis, 
do not make any sense independent of something else. They must be understood 
relationally and as context-dependent. The existence of particular discourses and forms of 
dominance are conditioned from something else - such as the presence of certain 
techniques, procedures, architectures. These are, in turn, again conditioned on, from or by 
something else. Therefore power is not something that people have, can acquire or share 
with others (see Foucault, 1993, p. 335). Power is conditioned on relations. In this way 
power is both intentional and non-subjective (see Foucault, 1993, p. 335). Actions are 
always intentional and purposive no matter if these are implicit or explicit, conscious or 
unconscious, consistent or inconsistent. But even if actions are always intentional, no 
individual or groups of individuals can be said to have invented them, since these also – 
along with their values and rationales – have to be placed in a context of actions, 
interactions and relations. In this way, Foucault solves the apparent contradiction that 
power analysis is on the one hand about feelings, passions, meanings, intentions and 
interests but on the other hand appears to completely eliminate the individual or the 
subject. Rather, it is only the individual with no history who is eliminated. The individual 
is seen as “embodied history,” one who expresses her fragmented character in words and 
actions under different conditions. 
 
Power emerges in the confrontation between different forces and is always local. 
Emergence is thus produced in every relation: 
 
”The omnipresence of power: not because it has the privilege of consolidating 
everything under its invincible unity, but because it is produced from one 
moment to the next, at every point, or rather in every relation from one point 
to another” (Foucault, 1993, p. 334). 
 
Power is a relation between forces, and every relation between forces is a power relation. 
The term relations is central here as the concept of force is not singular. It exists in 
relation to other forces such that every relation is already a relation of power. In this 
sense, power is everywhere. Resistance also plays an important role in Foucault’s power 
analytics. “Where there is power, there is resistance” (Foucault, 1993, p. 336). Power 
cannot exist without resistance, which is found everywhere in the power network: 
 
 “Their existence depends on a multiplicity of points of resistance: these play 
the role of adversary, target, support, or handle in power relations” (Foucault, 
1993, p. 336).  
 
Resistance is something that emerges in the confrontations and struggles between 
different and hostile forces and is necessary and unavoidable in any form of interaction. 
All forms of emergence can, in this sense, be understood as defined in the interplay 
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between “power” and “resistance.” They (resistances) are the odd terms in relations of 
power; they are inscribed in the latter (relations of power) as irreducible opposites are” 
(Foucault, 1993, p. 336). But power/resistance does not reflect a battle between different 
groups or classes in society. The relationship describes how action leads to action, which 
leads to action ad infinitum. It is a question of how different actions give different 
opportunities and limitations for future actions: to stimulate, to make easy or difficult, to 
enhance or delimit, to make more or less probable (see also Kendall & Wickham, 1999, 
pp. 50-51). Resistance is thus not necessarily the resistance which repressed groups 
exercise against a superior force. Resistance can be compared with simple 
misunderstandings, compromises, failure to persuade, technical problems, breakdowns in 
systems or any kind of problems associated with transferring the intentions of actors’ to 
other actors or systems. Resistance is simply an expression for the interaction between 
power and power’s object. This interaction always causes minor or major shifts in the 
course of history. Kendall and Wickham (1999, pp. 48-49) suggest another use of the 
English word “power” in this connection, namely power as an energy source. This double 
meaning of the word power is interesting. It is much easier to console with the suggestion 
that power is productive when perceiving power as an energy source. However, this 
should not overshadow the fact that the primary description of power provided by 
Foucault is in terms of inequality, imbalance, dominance, difference and control. He 
doesn’t condemn the presence of these characteristics in present day society. A 
genealogical analysis of power reveals the conditions under which certain 
discourses/practices emerged, evolved and changed. It shakes up the foundations of these 
practices by demonstrating that their claims to truth and justice are inherently fragile and 
questionable in light of the ruthless critique of history. 
 
But this doesn’t imply looking for a secret conspiracy. Rather a social configuration such 
as an organization must be perceived as constituted by continuous confrontations and 
struggles. Actors have – via the relations that they themselves are part of – different 
positions and strengths and thereby different possibilities of defining what is right and 
what is wrong, what is good and what is bad, what is moral and what is immoral. 
 
”Power is not an institution, and not a structure; neither is it a certain strength 
we are endowed with; it is the name that one attributes to a complex 
strategical situation in a particular society” (Foucault, 1993, p. 334). 
 
Genealogical power analysis therefore has no intention of pointing fingers at people. It 
does not seek to point out who is to blame and who is guilty. The relational aspect of 
genealogical power analysis does not allow this to happen. In genealogies no one is 
guilty—or perhaps it is more correct to say that everybody is guilty, as all play a part in 
the emergence of power relations to which all – at the same time – are subject. 
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